Recently uploaded by Paolo Magnone
16th Wold Sanskrit Conference - Section of Philosophy - Select Papers. Ed. by G. Pellegrini, 2025
In the introduction to his Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtras, king Bhoja, the XI sec. phi... more In the introduction to his Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary to the Yogasūtras, king Bhoja, the XI sec. philosopher Paramāra ruler, proudly vaunts the terseness and perspicuity of his commentatorial work in contradistinction to the practice of others who, as he remarks with some irony, are wont to obscure what is clear by much unnecessary philosophical prattle, whereas they quickly dispose of what is really in need of explanation with an easy spaṣṭam (“[the sense is] plain”). In reality, Bhoja’s commentary sometimes gives the impression of a certain shallowness as compared to the “standard” commentary going by the name of Vyāsa, and at places it even seems to betray a poor understanding of the root text, or indeed a faulty conception of its philosophical implications. After giving some relevant examples, the paper concentrates on one major instance, where at three different places (II, 6; III, 35; III, 55) Bhoja seems to deny the kartṛtva of prakṛti, contradicting the basic Sāṃkhya tenet, also shared by Yoga, which ascribes unconscious agency to Nature and idle consciousness to Spirit. The misconception is noticed also in the Kiraṇa subcommentary to the Rājamārtaṇḍa by Śrīkṛṣṇavallabhācārya, who tries to exhonerate Bhoja from blame, albeit with only partial success.
![Research paper thumbnail of L’eresia di Yājñavalkya. Ahiṁsā, vegetarismo e zoofagia nell’India antica [Yājñavalkya’s Heresy. Ahiṁsā, Vegetarianism and Zoofagy in Ancient India]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/111659470/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Asiatica Ambrosiana, 2023
Taking its cue from Yājñavalkya's famous one-off cryptic pronouncement in favour of meat-eating, ... more Taking its cue from Yājñavalkya's famous one-off cryptic pronouncement in favour of meat-eating, and building on the ground-breaking work by Alsdorf and others, this essay attempts to draw a passably coherent picture of the development of Indian vegetarianism out of the daunting mass of the diverse and often contradictory statements found scattered throughout the śāstras (‘codes of the law’). To summarize, whereas it is not doubtful, despite the outrage of many contemporary Brahmanic Hindus, that sacrificed animals (and even cows!) were consumed in Vedic times, meat-eating fell gradually into disfavour chiefly owing to the rise of the ideal of ahiṁsā (‘non-violence’) as brandished mainly as an anti-sacrificial weapon by the heterodox VI cent. BC (and earlier) śrāmaṇa movements such as Jainism and Buddhism. It should be noted, however, that ahiṁsā did not automatically entail a strict. ethically motivated vegetarianism in both religions (and a vegetarian diet is still not compulsory for Buddhists to this day), as it seems to have originally been held mostly on tabuistic grounds. Ahiṁsā was later adopted by Brahmanic Hinduism and provided with a sounder philosophical grounding (although magico-tabuistic preoccupations did survive to some extent) in the two core upaniṣadic doctrines of advaita (‘monism’) and rebirth: where all is One, the animal I kill is (my)Self; where everybody reincarnates, the animal I kill is but the fallen condition of one who was once a man: hence animals must not be killed.
![Research paper thumbnail of The “Proof” of Īśvara’s [God’s] Existence in Yogasūtra I, 25 and its Structural Resonances with the Classical Argument “ex gradibus entium” in Scholastic Theology [DRAFT]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/97205878/thumbnails/1.jpg)
The topic of the proofs of God’s existence in the context of Indian philosophy is usually brought... more The topic of the proofs of God’s existence in the context of Indian philosophy is usually brought up in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and particularly with the “the crown and glory of the literature bearing on this subject” (G. Bhattacharyya), i.e. the Nyāyakusumañjali of Udayana. While the problem of the foundation of a rational theology became central for the above school between ca. 600 and 900 CE, an intriguing anticipation at a much earlier date can be descried in the still rudimentary theology sketched in a cluster of aforisms in the Samādhi Pāda of the Yogasūtras. In particular, YS I, 15 (tatra niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam, translated by Woods as «in this [Īśvara] the germ of the omniscient is at its utmost excellence») sounds like an argument of sorts for God’s existence, and as such it has been regarded by the commentators, who have taken pains to make explicit the logical structure of the proof. This paper will discuss some of the interpretations offered, pointing out and briefly discussing the striking resemblance in theoretical structure of the proof (in particular as expounded by Vijñānabhikṣu) to the classical argument “ex gradibus entium” of scholastic theology.
M. Angelillo, C. Bulfoni, F. Fasulo a cura di), Forme e interpretazioni reciproche delle diversità in Asia, Milano (Asiatica Ambrosiana 10-11), 2021
[The «Renaissance Orientale and the Imagination of India in the Literature of Romanticism]
M. Angelillo (a cura di), M. K. Gandhi. Storia, diaogo e influenze cristiane, ICOO-Luni, 2022
Comparative Studies by Paolo Magnone
![Research paper thumbnail of ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΕΑΥΤΟΝ - आत्मैव विजिज्ञासितव्यः
El ojo como espejo del sí mismo en la India y en Grecia
[Gnôthi seautón - ātmaiva vijijñāsitavyaḥ: the Eye as Mirror of the Self in India and Greece]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/88727654/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2022
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an i... more The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know him through Plato, who mentions the motto in connection with Socrates’ attitude to philosophical enquiry in no less than five dialogues (Philebus, Phædrus, Charmides, Protagoras, Timaeus, Alcibiades I). On the other side, exhortations to know (one’s)self are rife in the Indian Upaniṣads, beginning with Yājñavalkya’s famous admonishment to his beloved “philosophical” wife, Maitreyī, that the ātman alone should be contemplated, listened to, reflected and meditated upon. But what is the “self” which is the object of the quest in both philosophical traditions? On the Indian side, its equation with the spiritual principle is more straightforward, since the term ātman covers at once both the function as the reflexive pronoun and the meaning of “soul”. On the Greek side, on the other hand, the equation of tò autó with psychḗ is not immediately apparent, and must be gained through philosophical investigation. In both traditions, however, access to the real essence of the ātman/psychḗ is difficult to obtain through rational discourse, and extra-rational devices are sometimes resorted to in order to assist and catalyze the theoretical insight. Among them, surprisingly enough, the metaphor of the pupil of the eye, named equivalently kórē and kanīnikā in either language, is applied on very similar terms in the story of Prajāpati’s teaching to Indra and Virocana narrated in the eighth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in Socrates’ instruction to Alcibiades in the dialogue named after the latter.
Γνῶθι σεαυτόν - आत्मैव विजिज्ञासितव्यः The Eye as Mirror of the Self in India and Greece
The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an i... more The motto of the Delphic oracle, γνῶθι σεαυτόν (nosce te ipsum, “know thyself”), has enjoyed an immense fortune in Western philosophical culture; among the early Greek thinkers it became particularly associated with Socrates as we know him through Plato, who mentions the motto in connection with Socrates’ attitude to philosophical enquiry in no less than five dialogues (Philebus, Phædrus, Alcibiades I, Charmides, Protagoras). On the other side, exhortations to know (one’s)self are rife in the Indian Upaniṣads, beginning with Yājñavalkya’s famous admonishment to his beloved “philosophical” wife, Maitreyī, that the ātman alone should be contemplated, listened to, reflected and meditated upn. But what is the “self” which is the object of the quest in both philosophical traditions? On the Indian side, its equation with the spiritual principle is more straightforward, since the term ātman covers at once both the function as the reflexive pronoun and the meaning of “soul”. On the Greek side, on the other hand, the equation of tò autó with psychē is not immediately apparent, and must be gained through philosophical investigation. In both traditions, however, access to the real essence of the ātman/psychē is difficult to obtain through rational discourse, and extra-rational devices are sometimes resorted to in order to assist and catalyze the theoretical insight. Among them, surprisingly enough, the metaphor of the pupil of the eye, named equivalently kórē and kanīnikā in either language, is applied on very similar terms in the story of Prajāpati’s teaching to Indra and Virocana narrated in the 8th prapāṭaka of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and in Socrates’ instruction to Alcibiades in the dialogue named after the latter.
Richard Seaford (ed.), Universe and Inner Self in Early Indian and Early Greek Thought, Edinburgh, 2016
The intriguing similarity between the allegories of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phædrus and in th... more The intriguing similarity between the allegories of the soul chariot in Plato’s Phædrus and in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad has been pointed out — if not thoroughly investigated — by several scholars, accompanied with varying assessments, largely dependent on each individual scholar’s assumptions concerning the bare possibility or the degree of likelihood of contacts and influences between early Greek and Indian thought, the significance (or otherwise) of the intercultural comparative endeavour, or, indeed, the methodological soundness of even positing the question, in the almost complete absence of pertinent historical documentation.
Because assessments are to such a great extent influenced by theoretical assumptions, the paper will start with some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological discourses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore.
A review of the relevant texts of the Phædrus and the Kaṭhopaniṣad will come next, setting out both the congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A detailed survey of kindred passages in both literary traditions (which I have presented elsewhere) lies outside the purview of this paper, but a summary reference to its results will help substantiate the contention that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to upaniṣadic thought in a way that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion in a westward direction.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss what I regard as the paramount difference — i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phædrus allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha — and its significance as a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced Greek philosophy.
Textos y contextos (II). Exégesis y hermenéutica de obras tardoantiguas y medievales, Mar del Plata 2012, 2012
![Research paper thumbnail of Diventare è ricordare: una versione indiana [della dottrina platonica] dell’anamnesi
[Becoming is Remembering. An Indian Version of [Plato’s Doctrine of] Anamnesis]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/64342590/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Alice Crisanti, Cinzia Pieruccini, Chiara Policardi, Paola M. Rossi (a cura di), Anantaratnaprabhava. Studi in onore di Giuliano Boccali, Milano (Consonanze - Collana del Dipartimento di Studi letterari, filologici e linguistici, Università degli Studi di Milano), 2017
As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis aims to provide a solution to a difficult ep... more As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis aims to provide a solution to a difficult epistemological problem: how can one learn what he still ignores? for, if he utterly ignores it, he cannot even purpose to learn it. The answer of the Meno is that learning actually is remembering what we used to know, but have forgotten. For its part, the Yogasūtra in a group of aphorisms of the Kaivalya Pāda confronts us with what seems to amount to an intriguing variant of the same doctrine, this time meant to cope with an “existential” problem typically Indian, yet in a way similar: how can one become (as a consequence of karman) what he was not? He who was not a cow in the former life did not possess her competences either (e.g. relishing pasture); hence how can he assume her mode of being in the next life? Patañjali’s answer is similar to Plato’s: taking on a mode of being actually is becoming once again what we had already been, although we do not consciously remember it. ========== Com’è noto, la dottrina platonica dell’anamnesi intende fornire una soluzione a un difficile problema epistemologico: come si può imparare ciò che ancora non si conosce? Infatti, se non lo si conosce per nulla, neppure ci si può proporre di impararlo. La risposta del Menone è che conoscere è in effetti ricordare quanto già in qualche modo sappiamo ma avevamo dimenticato. Dal canto suo, un gruppo di aforismi del Kaivalya Pāda degli Yoga Sūtra ci presenta una curiosa variante della medesima dottrina, intesa questa volta ad affrontare un problema “esistenziale” tipicamente indiano, eppure in qualche modo simile: come si può diventare (per effetto del karman) ciò che non si era? Chi non era nella scorsa vita una vacca neppure ne possedeva le competenze (per esempio, cibarsi d’erba); come può dunque assumerne il modo di essere nella vita ventura? La risposta degli Yoga Sūtra è analoga a quella del Menone: assumere un modo di essere è in effetti ridiventare ciò che già siamo stati ma di cui non serbiamo piú memoria consapevole.
![Research paper thumbnail of Becoming Is Remembering: ‘Anamnesis’ in the Yogasūtras [DRAFT]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56998696/thumbnails/1.jpg)
As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anámnēsis aims to provide a solution to a difficult ep... more As is well known, the Platonic doctrine of anámnēsis aims to provide a solution to a difficult epistemological problem: how can one learn what he still ignores? for, if he utterly ignores it, he cannot even purpose to learn it. The answer of the Meno is that learning actually is remembering what we used to know, but have forgotten. On the other hand, some aphorisms of the Kaivalya Pāda of the Yogasūtras confront us with what seems to amount to an intriguing variant of the same doctrine, this time meant to cope with an “existential” problem typically Indian, yet in a way similar: how can one become (as a consequence of karman) what he was not? He who was not a cow in the former life did not possess her competences either (e.g. relishing pasture); hence how can he assume her mode of being in the next life? According to the interpretation of the relevant sūtras offered in Bhoja’s Rājamārtaṇḍa commentary, Patañjali’s answer turns out to bear an uncanny resemblance to Plato’s: taking on a mode of being actually is becoming once again (i.e. “recalling”, as it were) what we had already been, although we do not consciously remember it.
This paper fits into the author’s ongoing undertaking to approach some fundamental philosophical themes in the kindred Greek and Indian philosophical traditions from a comparative perspective, showing how such approach can benefit both sides by fostering a deeper understanding of shared philosophical questions. In relation to the present object, it will be shown how the frame of the Platonic anámnēsis can help throw light on the import of a hitherto neglected group of pātañjala sūtras, while intimating a new possibility for the interpretation of a moot passage in Plato’s Meno which has so far defied the perspicacity of the scholars.
Studia Indologiczne, Warsaw, 2000
The deluge myth, while enjoying a wide diffusion all over the Eurasian continent, has found its m... more The deluge myth, while enjoying a wide diffusion all over the Eurasian continent, has found its most important literary developments in the Near-eastern, Classical and Indian worlds. Apropos of these traditions, the question has often been raised of their mutual relationship. As regards the Indian tradition in particular, several renowned scholars of the past have postulated its dependance on the sumero-semitic tradition, but nowadays the prevailing opinion speaks in favour of its autonomous development. Nevertheless, the structure of the Indian myth, whose careful recognition should indeed constitute the requisite basis for any further insight into the problem of its relationships, has not been adequately investigated.
In my paper I purpose first of all a survey of the extant material by presenting, besides the well-known versions of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya and Bhāgavata Purāṇa, to which the analysis has usually been confined so far, some other less known versions, like those of the Viṣṇudharmottara and Kālikā Purāṇa, which add highly significant traits to the picture. Secondly, on the basis of that material, I intend to show as the Indian myth as a whole exhibits its own peculiar structure, quite different from the structure of the myths of the other great traditions, except for a couple of very generic features, which are, I should think, almost unavoidable in any deluge myth by reason of its very internal structure, and are as such quite worthless in either establishing or denying any historical relationship whatsoever.
It had already been remarked, in this connection, that the Indian myth lacks all kind of ethical motivation, as the deluge itself is part of the ongoing cosmogonic process, hence naturally grounded; or that the closing sacrifice has an utterly different meaning in the Indian and semitic myth. However, scholars had hitherto failed to notice, as I believe, the specifically Indian import of the symbolism of the ship — tipically preexistent, and not fashioned by the protégé —, the peculiarity of the symbolic plexus of the ship and fish, later enriched by the rope as third element, and its solidarity with other mythical representations, with which a deep-rooted homology unexpectedly comes to light in spite of the seeming eterogeneity.
In conclusion, the Indian deluge myth shows unmistakable original traits in its indissoluble connection with such typically Indian themes as (to mention but a few) the multilevel cyclical cosmic structure, the notion of residue, the avatāra, the divine monoceros, the earth foundering under the burden of the living.
![Research paper thumbnail of El mito indio del diluvio en su relación con los cuentos clásicos y próximo-orientales
[The Indian Deluge Myth in its Relationship with Classical and Near-Eastern Narratives]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/55679760/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Sarasvatī, Madrid, 2006
El mito del diluvio, aunque goce de una gran difusión en todo el continente euroasiático, ha logr... more El mito del diluvio, aunque goce de una gran difusión en todo el continente euroasiático, ha logrado sus desarrollos literarios más importantes en el Cercano Oriente, en el mundo clásico y en la India. A propósito de estas tradiciones, muy a menudo se ha planteado la pregunta de su relación recíproca. En cuanto a la tradición india en particular, varios eruditos de renombre en el pasado habían postulado su dependencia de la tradición sumero-semítica, pero hoy en día la opinión predominante habla a favor de su desarrollo autónomo. No obstante, la estructura del mito indio, cuyo detenido análisis debería constituir la base indispensable para una mejor comprensión del problema de sus relaciones, no ha sido adecuadamente investigada. En este ensayo se introduce primeramente una presentación del material existente, que incluye, además de las versiones usuales del Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya y Bhāgavata Purāṇa, algunas otras versiones menos conocidas, como las del Viṣṇudharmottara y Kālikā Purāṇa, que añaden rasgos muy reveladores al cuadro. Después, sobre la base de ese material, se intenta mostrar como el mito indio exhibe su propia estructura características , diferente de la estructura de los mitos de las otras grandes tradiciones, a excepción de un par de elementos muy genéricos, que son, creo yo, casi inevitables en cualquier mito de diluvio en razón de su necesidad interna, y por lo tanto no tienen consecuencia para establecer o rechazar cualquier relación histórica que sea. Ya se había señalado, a este respecto, que el mito indio carece de toda forma de motivación ética, ya que el diluvio en sí constituye parte del proceso cosmogónico, y por lo tanto tiene una base natural; o que el sacrificio final tiene un sentido completamente diferente en el mito indio y semítico. Sin embargo, hasta ahora los estudiosos han pasado por alto la particularidad específicamente india del simbolismo del barco — típicamente preexistente, y no fabricado por el protegido —; la peculiaridad del plexo simbólico del barco y del pez, enriquecido posteriormente por la cuerda como tercero elemento; y su coherencia con otras representaciones míticas, en cuya conexión sale inesperadamente a la luz una homología profundamente arraigada a pesar de la aparente heterogeneidad de las imágenes. En conclusión, el mito indio del diluvio exhibe rasgos originales inconfundibles en su enlace indisoluble con temas típicamente indios como (por mencionar sólo algunos) la estructura cósmica cíclica, la noción de residuo, el avatāra, el divino monocerote, el hundimiento de tierra bajo la carga de los vivientes
![Research paper thumbnail of Matsyāvatāra: scenari indiani del diluvio
[Matsyāvatāra: Indian Sceneries of the Deluge]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56896758/thumbnails/1.jpg)
S. Sani (a cura di), Atti del Nono Convegno Nazionale di Studi Sanscriti (Genova, 23-24 ottobre 1997), 1999
Il mito del diluvio, pur godendo di un'ampia diffusione in tutto il continente euroasiatico, ha o... more Il mito del diluvio, pur godendo di un'ampia diffusione in tutto il continente euroasiatico, ha ottenuto i suoi più importanti sviluppi letterari nel vicino Oriente, nel mondo classico e in India. Riguardo a queste tradizioni, si è spesso sollevata la questione della loro reciproca relazione. Per quanto concerne, in particolare, la tradizione indiana, molti rinomati studiosi del passato hanno postulato una sua dipendenza dalla tradizione sumero-semitica, ma oggi l'opinione prevalente si pronuncia a favore del suo sviluppo autonomo; tuttavia, la struttura del mito indiano, la cui attenta analisi dovrebbe costituire la base indispensabile per una migliore comprensione del problema dei loro rapporti, non è stato ancora adeguatamente indagato. Il presente contributo presenta dapprima una breve rassegna del materiale, comprendente, oltre alle versioni ben note dello Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya e Bhagavata Purana, cui l'analisi si è finora solitamente limitata, anche alcune altre versioni meno note, come quelle del Viṣṇudharmottara e del Kālikā Purāṇa, che aggiungono tratti assai significativi al quadro. Quindi sulla base di quel materiale si cerca di mostrare come il mito indiano nel suo complesso presenti una struttura unica, differente dalla struttura dei miti delle altre grandi tradizioni in questione, fatta eccezione per un paio di caratteristiche molto generiche che devono essere, si direbbe, praticamente inevitabili in qualsiasi mito del diluvio in ragione della sua necessità intrinseca, e quindi non hanno rilevanza nello stabilire o rifiutare rapporti storici di sorta. Era già stato osservato, a questo proposito, che il mito indiano è privo di qualsiasi forma di motivazione etica, in quanto l'alluvione in sé è parte del processo cosmogonico e quindi ha una base naturale; o che il sacrificio finale ha una valenza completamente diversa nel mito indiano e semitico. Tuttavia, gli studiosi avevano finora mancato di rilevare la valenza specificamente indiana del simbolismo della nave — tipicamente preesistente, e non fabbricata dal protetto —; la peculiarità del plesso simbolico della nave e del pesce, in seguito arricchito dalla fune come terzo elemento; e la sua solidarietà con altre rappresentazioni mitiche, con cui viene inaspettatamente alla luce un’omologia profondamente radicata nonostante l'apparente eterogeneità delle immagini. In conclusione, il mito indiano del diluvio presenta caratteristiche originali distintive nel suo legame indissolubile con temi tipicamente indiani come (per citarne solo alcuni) la struttura cosmica ciclica , la nozione del residuo, l'avatāra, il divino monocero, lo sprofondamento della terra sotto il peso dei viventi.
P. A. Rossi / I. Li Vigni / E. Miconi (a cura di), Sulle ali del sogno, Milano, 2009
![Research paper thumbnail of Paideía e saṁskṛti: qualche spunto di riflessione
[Paideía and Saṁskṛti: Some Food for Thought]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/55705685/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Kuniko Tanaka (a cura di), L’educazione nella società asiatica, Milano (Asiatica Ambrosiana 6), 2014
«Other nations made gods, kings, spirits; the Greeks alone made men» wrote famously Jäger, enthus... more «Other nations made gods, kings, spirits; the Greeks alone made men» wrote famously Jäger, enthusiastically celebrating the purported exceptionality of the Greek ‘miracle’ in his epoch-making early XX century work, Paideia. Die Formung des griechischen Menschen, which was to exert a persistent influence on western self-representation, giving new scope to western supremacism by the added distinction of its Hellenic roots. Taking its cue from Jäger’s advocacy of paideía, or culture in the higher sense of Bildung, as a uniquely Greek (and by extension European) creation, this paper seeks to expose the untenability of such an assumption by comparison to the parallel notion of saṁskṛti in the Indian milieu. It does so first of all by arguing that Jäger’s premises are flawed and methodologically unsound on various accounts, and most of all because they endorse a restrictive notion of culture that, in addition to being unreasonable in itself, is utterly inconducive to fruitful historical investigation. Secondly, after a brief discussion of the Vedic and priestly foundations of the peculiarly Indian notion of culture vis-à-vis the Homeric and aristocratic roots of the Greek one, the paper tries to show, with the help of several examples, how the Indian notion of saṁskṛti, besides possessing its own unique features over against the Greek paideía, also shares with the latter a number of parallel traits, and most importantly the very concept, which Jäger recognizes as paramount, of culture as the conscious creation of an ideal type which selectively binds its exponents to the preservation and transmission of the values of an élite — however differently embodied, in the warrior aristocracy, in Greece, and in the priestly class in India. Nevertheless, despite the major role played by the brāhmaṇas as the custodians of high culture throughout Indian history, the contribution of the kṣatriya class has by no means been of lesser consequence. After an intermezzo challenging the notion, still fondly cherished in some circles, of the unmistakably Greek specificity of that all-important department of culture, i.e. philosophy, the paper winds up by drawing a quick sketch of the outstanding culture-shaping significance of the Indian epics, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, and their pervasive and enduring influence even well into the contemporary Indian society, exceeding by far whatever meaningfulness the Homeric epics may still be credited with in the contemporary ‘disenchanted’ western world.
![Research paper thumbnail of La risposta di un gimnosofista al quesito di Alessandro sull’origine del tempo: dottrina indiana?
[Does the gymnosophist’s reply to Alexander’s question on the origin of time indeed reflect an Indian doctrine?]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/56753676/thumbnails/1.jpg)
I. Piovano / V. Agostini (a cura di), Atti dell’Ottavo Convegno Nazionale di Studi Sanscriti (Torino, 20-21 ottobre 1995), 2001
The episode of Alexander’s interview with the gymnosophists has come down to us in several versio... more The episode of Alexander’s interview with the gymnosophists has come down to us in several versions, among which the one in Plutarch’s Vita Alexandri is the most renowned. In this connection, the question arises whether the solutions given by the naked philosophers to the puzzles propounded by Alexander can be shown to reflect genuine Indian doctrines. Challenging Dumézil’s reply in the affirmative, the author contends that they cannot. While most questions and answers are scarcely relevant to the investigation, as being of little (if any) philosophical import, the analysis concentrates on the more significant ones, and especially on the solution offered to the question as to which of the two — day or night — came first. According to Dumézil, the gymnosophist’s answer reported by Plutarch, i. e. that the day came first, by one day, reflects the vedic doctrine of the primeval cosmogonic role of Dawn and Light. Against this may be argued in the first place that such doctrine does not enjoy any prominent status in the Vedas themselves — quite to the contrary, it stands up disadvantegeously to many all-important texts, such as the Nāsadīyasūkta, which assign the primeval status to Darkness — and cannot therefore be regarded as being specifically Indian any more than its opposite. Secondly, it is shown that the Greek tradition is at great variance on this very point, to the extent that all logically conceivable solutions (i. e., precedence of day by one day / day by one night / night by one day / night by one night) are represented in some version or other. This inconsistency appears to stem from the fact that no particular doctrine (Indian or whatever) was envisaged; according to the present author, we have reason to believe that the gymnosophist’s reply was rather meant to set off by means of a paradox the sheer impossibility of a solution (all four alternatives being equivalent to that effect). This interpretation is reinforced by the gymnosophist’s own remark confessing the aporetical nature of his reply, and finally by a further recourse to paradox — this time a variant of the well-known “paradox of the liar” — which the author lays bare in the otherwise inexplicable dénouement of the anecdote.
Indian Philosophy and Yoga by Paolo Magnone
Uploads
Recently uploaded by Paolo Magnone
Comparative Studies by Paolo Magnone
Because assessments are to such a great extent influenced by theoretical assumptions, the paper will start with some methodological considerations in order to define the grounds, scope and limits of the attempted comparison, also drawing on the methodological discourses of other related fields, like mythology and folklore.
A review of the relevant texts of the Phædrus and the Kaṭhopaniṣad will come next, setting out both the congruencies and the discrepancies in the treatment of the chariot allegory. A detailed survey of kindred passages in both literary traditions (which I have presented elsewhere) lies outside the purview of this paper, but a summary reference to its results will help substantiate the contention that the allegory of the soul chariot is integral to upaniṣadic thought in a way that is unparalleled in Greek thought, thus supporting the conjecture of diffusion in a westward direction.
Finally, the paper will briefly discuss what I regard as the paramount difference — i.e. the conspicuous absence of the idle passenger in the Phædrus allegory vs. his centrality to the allegory of the Kaṭha — and its significance as a theoretical watershed between Upaniṣad-based Indian and Plato-influenced Greek philosophy.
This paper fits into the author’s ongoing undertaking to approach some fundamental philosophical themes in the kindred Greek and Indian philosophical traditions from a comparative perspective, showing how such approach can benefit both sides by fostering a deeper understanding of shared philosophical questions. In relation to the present object, it will be shown how the frame of the Platonic anámnēsis can help throw light on the import of a hitherto neglected group of pātañjala sūtras, while intimating a new possibility for the interpretation of a moot passage in Plato’s Meno which has so far defied the perspicacity of the scholars.
In my paper I purpose first of all a survey of the extant material by presenting, besides the well-known versions of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, Mahābhārata, Matsya and Bhāgavata Purāṇa, to which the analysis has usually been confined so far, some other less known versions, like those of the Viṣṇudharmottara and Kālikā Purāṇa, which add highly significant traits to the picture. Secondly, on the basis of that material, I intend to show as the Indian myth as a whole exhibits its own peculiar structure, quite different from the structure of the myths of the other great traditions, except for a couple of very generic features, which are, I should think, almost unavoidable in any deluge myth by reason of its very internal structure, and are as such quite worthless in either establishing or denying any historical relationship whatsoever.
It had already been remarked, in this connection, that the Indian myth lacks all kind of ethical motivation, as the deluge itself is part of the ongoing cosmogonic process, hence naturally grounded; or that the closing sacrifice has an utterly different meaning in the Indian and semitic myth. However, scholars had hitherto failed to notice, as I believe, the specifically Indian import of the symbolism of the ship — tipically preexistent, and not fashioned by the protégé —, the peculiarity of the symbolic plexus of the ship and fish, later enriched by the rope as third element, and its solidarity with other mythical representations, with which a deep-rooted homology unexpectedly comes to light in spite of the seeming eterogeneity.
In conclusion, the Indian deluge myth shows unmistakable original traits in its indissoluble connection with such typically Indian themes as (to mention but a few) the multilevel cyclical cosmic structure, the notion of residue, the avatāra, the divine monoceros, the earth foundering under the burden of the living.
Indian Philosophy and Yoga by Paolo Magnone